Saved by a Leatherman Tool!

Reported by: USFS, Ochoco NF, P.O. Box 490, Prineville,OR 97754

Event: Date: 02/13/97, Local time: 1545, Injuries: no,Damage: no

Location: North Fork Crooked River, Oregon, along Forestboundary T15S R21E

Mission: Type: elk census (recon), Procurement: OR Dep't.of Fish and Wildlife, Persons onboard: 3

Aircraft: Hiller 12E

I was asked to assist the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife(ODFW) conduct a census count on elk using a Sightability Modeldeveloped by Idaho Fish and Game. The model was designed to usea reciprocating engine helicopter with two observers and the pilot.ODFW had run into a pinch using their own personnel and on Thursdayafternoon (2/13) they could not get two of their employees tofly. I had cooperated all along with ODFW in this process to tryand procure accurate population estimates of elk occurring onthe Ochoco National Forest. I was being asked to fly in an "un-carded"aircraft and I knew it before departing.

I was asked to meet the fuel truck 4 miles up Teter's Road atapproximately 1200. When I arrived at the meeting place, the helicopterwas finishing the morning's census areas. I talked to the fueltruck driver (Ellen, the pilot's wife) about the helicopter andthe pilot (Philip) to satisfy my own safety concerns. I foundout he was FAA part 135 certified and had contracts with APHISfor conducting aerial coyote control. I also established the factthat we would be flight following with Ellen during the afternoonsurvey.

We started the elk survey at approximately 1400. We surveyed onecensus unit of about 4,000 acres and then started a second unit.We had been in the air approximately 1 1/2 hours when Philip suddenlysaid, "We have a problem." I was not initially concernedand said, "You will have to land it, right?" He thenreplied we had lost the collective and could not land and theproblem was a serious one. The collective control linkage rodhad come disconnected at the end where it connects to the collectivearm at the main rotor shaft.

Losing the collective will cause the helicopter to gain altitudesince the blades were at full pitch. I was sitting on the leftside of the bubble (the side where the linkage rod is locatedon the helicopter) and Philip said our only chance of survivalwas if I got out and tried to push up on the collective arm toadjust the blade pitch, reducing lift from the rotor blades. Iunbuckled from the seat, opened the door and carefully steppedout onto the skid. I wrapped the shoulder harness of the seatbelt several times around my left wrist. I kept a hold of theseat belt with my left hand. I found that I could not reach thecollective linkage unless I let go of the seat beld and climbedup from the skid onto the cargo basket.

I had some communication with Philip since I kept the headseton. It was very difficult to communicate, though, because of therotor, engine and wind noise. I heard him tell me to push thecollective arm up slowly. I tried to do this and the helicopterfell violently (Philip estimated more than 100 feet). Philip andthe passenger (Meg, ODFW employee) yelled to pull the other wayso I pulled back down on the collective arm and the helicopterstopped falling. I have no idea why I did not fall off the helicopterat that point.

I said if they (people in the helicopter) could find some sortof pin, I may be able to reconnect the linkage arm. They saidthey had nothing. Philip then said to pull down on the collectivearm. We found that if I pulled down VERY hard, we would shed elevationvery slowly. But I couldn't pull down hard enough for a long enoughtime to significantly lower the helicopter's altitude.

Philip had the helicopter in full forward speed to slow our ascent.He later told me he had the rotor RPM's 100 lower than red lineand we had a forward speed of 100 knots, 10 over maximum I guess.I rapidly started to get VERY cold, since the outside air temperaturewas about 20 degrees. The wind force had blown a contact out ofmy eye and my hat and sunglasses off. I also lost both gloves,because I used them over the collective arm to try and pull harder.I asked if there was something I could use to pry down on thecollective lever and Meg handed the fire extinguisher out. I triedthat a little and felt unstable pulling on it. I thought the fireextinguisher could go through the tail rotor, so I threw it downwith force to get rid of it. The whole time the pilot communicatedthe urgency of the situation by calmly saying, "You've gotto do it buddy or we are going to die."

We had been into the problem about 15 minutes when Philip contactedEllen and advised her of the problem. Ellen then phoned the Prinevilleairport and asked that the Oregon State Police be advised.

I was rapidly losing strength and mobility in my hands. Philipremembered he had a "Leatherman Tool" in his first aidkit. Meg rummaged around and found it and handed it out to mewith the file part opened. The collective linkage rod had a bearing-likeball in the end of it with a hole in the ball. Because of thevibration of the rotor, engine and wind, the ball was moving aroundin circles, making it difficult to start any sort of makeshiftpin unless it was pointed. I handed the Leatherman back in andasked Meg to open the leather awl part, which had a pointed tip.

I noticed we had gained enough altitude that we were getting intothe clouds. Philip said we had gotten to an altitude of 9,500feet . . . about 5,000 feet AGL. He also said the carb temp haddropped dangerously low, as had the fuel quantity.

When I got the Leatherman tool back with the leather awl opened,I first tried to get it started with my right hand since I amright handed. The forward air speed must have been too great,because I tried many times to get it started and I could not bringmy arm forward accurately. I switched the tool to my left handto attempt aligning the leather awl and have the wind from ourforward air speed help push my hand toward where I was working.I could not really feel the Leatherman Tool, since I had lostfeeling in my hands from the cold. I was getting VERY frustratedand angry, because I could not get the awl started into the linkagerod. Philip and Meg helped me focus and keep trying by constantlysaying "You almost got it" and You can do it."

After several tries, I got the leather awl started. I wiggledit in as much as I could and at the same time I heard Philip say,"We are going to live!" I knew I barely had the pointof the leather awl started into the linkage rod. I held as muchinward force onto the Leatherman Tool as I could muster so itdid not slip out. Philip descended now that he had collectivecontrol and we quickly landed on a scab flat near the Forest Boundary.I had to stay outside the helicopter to hold the tool in placethrough the entire descent to landing. He made a VERY soft andnormal landing. Philip notified Ellen by radio that we had landedOK. Meg had glanced at her watch when the incident started andwhen we landed. The time from the start of the problem to landingwas approximately 25 minutes.

After we collected our wits and assessed our location, we startedfiguring how we were going to get out. I had gotten my hands warmedup and quenched a great thirst by eating snow. We decided it wasa long walk out and there was no road access due to snow depth.Philip had discovered the linkage bolt when we was inspectingthe aircraft after we landed. It had fallen into the engine pan.He could not find the nut that went into the bolt. Philip putthe bold back through the linkage (which he said was difficultto insert on the ground with the engine off). The bold had a holein it for a safety wire. Meg mentioned that she had seen a safetypin in the first aid box. We thought that if we put the safetypin through the hole in the bolt, it should hold it in place,enabling us to fly the helicopter back to the fuel truck. Philipput the safety pin into the end of the bolt and instructed Megto keep her eye on the pin. If the safety pin came out, Philipthought he could land the helicopter before the bolt came out.Philip started the helicopter again and we flew it back to thefuel truck without any further events. After Philip installedthe proper lock nuts on the bolt, he and Meg flew the helicopterback to Prineville and I rode back in the fuel truck with Ellen.

I have some personal observations about this incident. First,it may seem easy to say I had a cavalier attitude toward the aviationpolicies in place with the Forest Service. To an extent, I didhave some question about the need and legitimacy of several ofour aviation policies. Also, there were other reasons why I didnot follow our policies that day. I believe that many employeesface the same situation I did regarding choices in flying in aircraftnot approved for our use. I know I have faced making this choicemany times during my career and most times I have not participatedin the flights. I was faced with a choice of getting the job done,a real need by ODFW for me to help them and with fostering a cooperativeattitude with another agency. I made the wrong choice, but atthe time it seemed the correct one to me. Second, a team effortdetermined the outcome of this situation. All people involvedretained a cool head and a positive attitude toward the eventualoutcome. It would have been very difficult to accomplish my taskif people inside the helicopter would not have been so cool andsupportive. I also think that Philip must be an excellent pilotto maintain a stable aircraft through several difficult moments.The main reason I was able to stay on the aircraft for nearly1/2 hour was because of the in-flight stability of the helicopter.There are no "heros" in this story, just people doingwhat was necessary to get the job of survival done given the circumstances.Lastly, I would like to comment on feelings in a situation likethis. I can only offer my own feelings. I never felt the feelingof fear during the incident. I had some frustration and angerat not getting "the job done" quicker. I would liketo think most people faced with a similar situation could reactsimilarly. Mabye the adrenaline rush is what keeps fear from creepingin. Anyway, I hope no one faces something like this, but it isreassuring to know that the body can still function in a difficultsituation like this.