The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined last year’s near collision between a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 and a FedEx Boeing 767 on an Austin, Texas, runway was caused by a lack of critical safety technology and errors made by an air traffic controller.
The Feb. 4, 2023, incident was one of several close calls that led to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) calling for an industry-wide safety summit. During the near-miss in Austin, the two jets came within 150 feet of colliding after being cleared to use the same runway. The FedEx crew averted disaster by initiating a go-around and overflying the Southwest aircraft after spotting its silhouette as it was rolling down the runway.
The report highlighted poor visibility conditions on the morning of the incident and the air traffic control tower’s lack of surface detection equipment for monitoring traffic on the taxiway and runway.
The NTSB cited the probable cause as the controller’s incorrect assumption that the Southwest Airlines jet would take off from the runway before the FedEx aircraft arrived, leading to a loss of separation between the two aircraft. Expectation bias, lack of situational awareness and the tower controllers’ lack of training on low-visibility operations were listed as contributing factors. Additionally, the NTSB noted that the Southwest flight crew contributed to the incident by not informing the controller that they would need additional time on the runway for an engine runup before takeoff.
“One missed warning, one incorrect response, even one missed opportunity to strengthen safety can lead to tragedy and destroy public confidence in our aviation system, which is precisely why we must learn from near misses such as these,” said NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy in a June 6 press release. “We are once again calling on the FAA to use technology to prevent runway incursions—something we’ve been doing for decades—because we must back up the humans operating in our aviation system at every level. That is how we save lives.”
The FAA said it would begin installing surface detection systems at some U.S. airports, including Austin, by the end of 2025.
The NTSB said the final incident report will be available in the coming weeks.
We already have more technology for aircraft positioning than ever in our history.
It’s not for lack of technology; this is for lack of decent controllers.
I agree with Art. I’ve been flying 54 years; I see a noticeable difference in the attitude, ability, courtesy, professionalism and willingness to work with the end users — you know, the people who die when the controller “F’s” up — these days different than ‘yesteryear.’ Not in every case and not in majority of cases but in far too many cases. They’re ‘different.’ And they’re being paid handsomely to be 100% perfect and can retire sooner than pilots. Must be tougher to be a local controller than a pilot? I wouldn’t know.
There’s a requirement for ADS-B to be ‘on’ even on the ground, these days. So why isn’t this data available to the local controller(s)? At my smaller airport in FL, the airport manager had a large TV monitor installed with a system so he can see and play back all the traffic when he gets a noise or other type of ops complaint right from his desk. It wasn’t too costly. Hell … I can feed my Aera 660 GPS from my GDL-50 IN my house and can see traffic … why is it gonna take until 2025? That setup would cost less than $2K. Oh well, EAGLE will take until 2030 so … I guess that’s pretty fast for the FAA? And I’m sure that any equipment they bring in will be orders of magnitude more costly (sic)!
Beyond this, the FAA has been hiring people to meet DEI quotas and has been sued for doing this. Did anyone look into this as a potential factor? I’d bet not … but ought to be. Finally, the schools and parents aren’t instilling into younger folks the same mores and values as was beat into MY thick skull back in my youth. Was this a factor? Dunno. What color was the hair on the errant controller? Are they covered in tattoos? Were they texting?
The FedEx crew are ‘hero’s’ given the weather conditions that day … GOOD JOB, guys. This coulda been a Tenerife moment in Austin but for THEIR attentiveness and professionalism.
Let the ad hominem attacks on Larry begin …
Ad hominem attacks? Looks to me like you’re the one focused on the hair color and tattoo status of the controllers rather than whether or not they’re good at their jobs.
I’m wasn’t sure if it was just me, or, was I really experiencing a degradation in ATC. I used to believe controllers were there to supplement safety. Not anymore. I have come to believe I have to rely totally upon myself when flying. I will continue to use all of the information controllers provide, however, all level of certainty for me is gone.
“ Hell … I can feed my Aera 660 GPS from my GDL-50 IN my house and can see traffic … why is it gonna take until 2025? That setup would cost less than $2K.”
Raspberry Pi 4 Starter kit: $90
USB ADSB dongle: $40
ADSB Antenna: $50
Weatherproof Enclosure: $30
Now ensure that system runs 24/7 without any software glitches, system crashes, or erroneous data, in all temperatures, in all humidity levels, while sustaining lightning strikes and brownouts. Then add protection against cybercriminals/terrorists who will happily spoof an ADS-B signal with a $200 HackRF to generate confusion or worse. Then guarantee that all patches are tested to not cause any problems, and still are installed as soon as they come out. Finally, add training for the controllers and maintenance personnel, then add 24 hour callout support with resolution within 1 hour.
Suddenly make sense why this stuff costs so much?
“ Now ensure that system runs 24/7 without any software glitches”
I can offer a four nines SLA
“ or erroneous data”
Data comes from the aircraft. The ADSB radio receiver simply decodes what is received. Data integrity is dependent on the aircraft.
“Then add protection against cybercriminals/terrorists who will happily spoof an ADS-B signal with a $200 HackRF to generate confusion or worse.”
The system would be stand alone. Any hack would depend on airport physical security. And if someone wanted to spoof an ADSB signal, it’s doesn’t matter if you spend $1mil or $100 dollars. That’s an ADSB signal that must be reported as received.
“ Finally, add training for the controllers and maintenance personnel, then add 24 hour callout support with resolution within 1 hour.”
Controllers are already trained on ADBS/Stars and ground tracking systems. Nothing changes here. Given the low cost, “maintenance” would be trash the broken unit, install a new unit, 10 minutes tops.
“ Suddenly make sense why this stuff costs so much?”
You’re confusing hardware (“stuff”) with support. The hardware as described is cheap. You’d still have to support and have maintainers, just like any other system.
“And if someone wanted to spoof an ADSB signal, it’s doesn’t matter if you spend $1mil or $100 dollars. That’s an ADSB signal that must be reported as received.”
Thankfully, you’re alone in this “just let the bad guys do whatever they want” perspective.
“Thankfully, you’re alone in this “just let the bad guys do whatever they want” perspective.”
If an ADSB signal is being spoofed, you wouldn’t know it. There is no difference between a “real” ADSB signal and a “spoofed” ADSB signal. Both are ADSB signals.
If you could tell the difference, it wouldn’t be “spoofed”.
This has nothing to do with “letting bad guys do whatever they want”.
Hi all,Larry,
You are spot on. I’ve posted before. Retired Atc 38 yrs. been retired now 8 yrs.
When ive told the truth, some people threw bricks at me, i guess im not pc enough.
My generation was after the strike, mostly out of military. Was a very dedicated and disciplined work force. The FAA got a good deal. Doing too much with too few for too long. We gave 150% . The current worforce is a reflection of todays society. Thats the reality, no one can argue that point.The hiring process has been a failure the last 10 yrs. when you value someone who has flunked math or science in school, been unemployed 50% in the last year, over military atc veterans, cti grads, people with pilot ratings, then you get abysmal people who can check boxes, but offer no more.
When the next collision happens, see how many boxes are checked.
michael.
Who better to second my anecdotal position than a retired ‘older’ ATC type. Thanks, Michael. I’m retired USAF and had a reputation for calling things what they are … a realist vs a ‘yes’ man. Sound like you’re one, too? Often times, that wasn’t a popular stance but what needed to be said or done did. What a sad commentary. And it doesn’t JUST apply to controllers; it’s everywhere these days. I’d like to know more about the training status of the controller and supervisor … I’d be willing to bet that what we’re saying IS a factor here?
Eons ago, there used to be FSS’s everywhere … hundreds of ’em; at some airports w/o towers, a dedicated FSS frequency was used to issue traffic advisories as a sort of pseudo tower. A pilot could walk into one of these places (without a reservation!) and get personal service, sage advice and sometimes even a free cup of coffee from some seasoned controller on duty with teletype machines clacking away in the background. I have a mental picture of one in Alma, GA where a crusty old guy offered me advice on how to penetrate a front safely when I was not familiar with the local weather patterns or area. An example of one of those little white FSS buildings sits at Pioneer airport in Oshkosh. I miss those days. I’d bet you know what I’m talking about?
Blaming this near catastrophe on a “lack of technology” is little more than an excuse hiding the ‘real’ problem which — IMHO — is far more pervasive than most people realize.
I’m afraid you’re right; the “the times they are a changin”
So right You’re, Mr, Larry S.
“ The current worforce is a reflection of today’s society.”
The current workforce is a reflection of the parents and the older workforce that trains them.
And one more point of interest. The Austin incident. 2 airplanes. two people in the tower. A supe and controller. SHAMEFUL.
michael.
And one more point, before the bricks start flying, i have many friends, all ages, all types, hair, tattoos, dress, persuasions….. and yes i know some transgender people.
I treat them all the same, and love them all. I may be a middle age white male , but im definetly not ‘THE’ problem. All i ever asked was when working the boards atc that the person sitting at the position next to me was well qualified, thrilled about having a chance to have a job like this, and came to work and give 150% to the pilots and the flying public. What i hear now is about a 30% disgrace level. Duds. This can be traced right back to the BQquestionare hiring practices. The FAA needs to start cracking down on poor performance. When i was working 3 errors in a 24 mo period you could be terminated. One error u lost your bonus for the year. Immediately removed from postion. If serious enough decertified on all positions. Now a slap on the wrist,
fill out a atsap form, like a pilot would fill put the nasa form, i.e. ‘get out of jail free card’ . Higher performance standards need to be installed. The FAA. and Mr Whitiker
should expect better.
There is no evidence in the NTSB report or any factual basis to suggest that Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives had anything to do with the event involving the air traffic controller. The NTSB report highlighted specific causes and contributing factors for the near collision, including:
1. The controller’s incorrect assumption about the Southwest Airlines jet’s departure timing.
2. Expectation bias, lack of situational awareness, and inadequate training for low-visibility operations.
3. The absence of surface detection equipment in the control tower.
4. The Southwest flight crew’s failure to inform the controller about their need for additional time on the runway for an engine runup.
5. 1/4 vis at night did not help.
I agree with some of the points Michael R. mentioned. However, blaming DEI hiring practices for lowering the quality of air traffic controllers without providing evidence is unfounded. This shifts focus away from the actual causes identified in the report, which include human error, technological gaps, and communication issues. The comments are critical and dismissive, focusing on personal attacks and unfounded claims rather than the facts.
By the way, consider the Tenerife disaster. The primary fault was attributed to the KLM captain for initiating takeoff without explicit clearance from ATC. Contributing factors included miscommunication between the flight crews and ATC, poor visibility due to fog, and the lack of ground radar to monitor aircraft positions. It’s a parallel situation where multiple factors, not just one, led to a near-tragic event at Austin.
Raf … I didn’t BLAME DEI … I said, I’d like to know IF the controller / supervisor was a DEI hire? I asked if this point had been looked into as a potential factor. I said the same thing about potentially texting … something Cavedweller also asks about below.
You invoked DEI. You “asked” the question. You brought it into the conversation out of the blue, which is a back-handed way of imputing blame. You don’t get to duck here. That’s dishonest.
…but then raising DEI or “woke” as a concern is fundamentally dishonest. Just stop.
And You must also stop. And, BTW, I don’t care, not even a little bit, of the comms you may intend to answer me. Just don’t care or even read them in the future.
Couldn’t agree more, Herveus. I’m very tired of people throwing the DEI red herring around whenever there is evidence of a human failure. It’s BS. Just stop.
DEI = Discipline … Excellence … Intelligence
1. The controller’s incorrect assumption about the Southwest Airlines jet’s departure timing.
Resp: No controller worth anything would assume anything about a pilots timing when they couldnt see them. Most likely the Southwest aircraft wasnt at the hold short line (ILS) when they called ready for takeoff. WHY the controller didnt verify the position of the aircraft prior to issuing a departure clearance dosent fall on training. If falls on the competence of the person working the tower.
2. Expectation bias, lack of situational awareness, and inadequate training for low-visibility operations.
Resp: If you cant SEE them dont assume you KNOW where they are. There is no excuse for EXPECTATION BIAS. Training for low-visibility operations is a JOKE. IF YOU CANT SEE THEM THEN FIND OUT WHERE THEY ARE!!
3. The absence of surface detection equipment in the control tower.
Resp: This is another weak excuse for lack of competence. Training for low-visibility operations is a JOKE. IF YOU CANT SEE THEM THEN FIND OUT WHERE THEY ARE!!
4. The Southwest flight crew’s failure to inform the controller about their need for additional time on the runway for an engine runup.
Resp: Another excuse for a bad controller. The Southwest pilot said they were ready for departure, there is ZERO requirement for them to notify the controller WHERE they are in the taxi to the runway when they call the tower ready for departure. The controller needs to KNOW where they are when they clear someone for take off. To assume that they are at a hold line when you cant see them is plain stupidity.
5. 1/4 vis at night did not help.
Resp: This is also an excuse. Know where your traffic is at ALL times when issuing control instructions. If you cant see the traffic you can use NON-RADAR procedures. 2 increasing to 3 within 1.
I’d like to know the cell phone records of the controller at the time they were working.
I’d like to know the training history of the controller as well.
Firings need to occur for lack of professionalism. This controller made ZERO efforts to correct the situation when they didnt see the departure tag on the scope in a timely manner.
Tenerife wasnt ANYTHING like this!
One more point of interest.
wx. VV002. vis 1/4 fog
no asde in twr cab
basically solid fog . TWR cant see either plane. fed ex 3 mi final. twr clears swa for takeoff.
fed ex captain stunned. aks FO to verify landing clearance. Fed ex has good situational awareness. fed ex t
aborts, tells swa
fed ex aborts, tells swa to abort. incredible! the two duds in the twr cab have no business to be in this career. you get paid to seperate planes, not put them together. . if you let them continue they will someday kill people. it came out after this accident numerous comments about the controllers poor skills.
I saw so much bs in 38 yrs, most swept under the rug.
i was there. nobody can dispute what i saw. AGAIN im ringing the alarm bell.
I have a few airline trips this summer. im hoping i dont get killed.
from people that got hired that flunked math and science, and were unemployed 6 mo before they hit the jackpot.
We are on the verge of a major disaster happening.
michael.
Cavedweller,
I appreciate your perspective on the critical importance of situational awareness and the necessity of verifying aircraft positions. You raise valid points about the inherent responsibilities of air traffic controllers. However, it’s essential to consider that the NTSB report identified multiple contributing factors, not solely the controller’s actions.
Expectation bias and lack of situational awareness are human errors that can occur even among well-trained and competent professionals, especially under high-stress conditions and inadequate technology support. While it’s true that controllers must be vigilant and verify positions, the absence of surface detection equipment significantly increases the risk of errors, particularly in low-visibility conditions. Training improvements are crucial, but so is equipping our control towers with the necessary tools to minimize human error.
Instead of focusing solely on individual competence, we should advocate for a comprehensive approach that includes better training, advanced technology, and robust communication protocols. This multifaceted strategy can help prevent similar incidents in the future.
Best regards,
Raf Sierra
There is truth in what you say: ground radar/ADS-B displays can definitely help controllers identify potential conflicts and respond as necessary. I’m also a huge fan of looking at scenarios such as this comprehensively, not just calling it the ATC equivalent of “pilot error” and moving on.
Having said that, this incident resulted from some seriously basic incompetence and bad judgment. Trying to run a “squeeze play” with the only two aircraft you have under low-vis conditions in the dark borders on idiotic, especially when you’re essentially guessing what one of them is doing. There was no need for that AT ALL, and that lack of control judgment is what set this up. Technology can certainly improve decision making, but to me the fundamental failing here was why this controller felt comfortable doing this in the first place. Something got missed in training or the evaluation process, and that needs to be corrected. The “Don’t be a dope” rule is real – knowing where your airplanes are and exactly how they are being separated is as basic as it gets.
Cell phones in the tower? It is a surprise to me that controllers are even allowed to take their personal cell phones into the operating environment, let alone use them! Surely this can’t be right?
You would be shocked! People have smart watches on in the facility, you will hear the phones ring in the facility. The operating rooms should be shielded so cell phones can not work in them.
Urmuhgawd! Cell phones and smart watches!
Just like any other professional, silence or turn off your cell phone.
For those of you that flew back-in-the-day you may recall the old weather symbols. The teletype symbol “0” stood for “Clear” in the cloud coverage column, and stood for zero in all other columns. For example W0X0F was “indefinite zero ceiling, sky obscured, zero vis, in fog”. Jokingly we used to say WOW-CLEAR-XTRA-CLEAR-FLY. This is where the terms Zero-Zero and Woxoff came from.
Anyone who has flown or trained for low vis ops knows it can quadruple work-load and time. Certainly a controller, with experience , should know the same. The controller should have known the SWA pilot would need more time because of the low vis and should not have issued the takeoff clearance. The SWA pilot should have rejected the clearance. I don’t know about you, but as a pilot I hate to be pressured in those circumstances. Why not just call this what it is, controller error and FAA error? To do otherwise would mean the current system is unsafe, without the new technology, and we should shut down immediately.
Maybe the FAA could borrow some of that $7 billion dollars Biden allocated for EV chargers for some ground radars. After all, only 7 EV chargers have been installed in the past year.
Retired ATC-USAF. Controller should have held SWA imo. If the controller told SWA “cleared for immediate takeoff or hold short. Traffic a Fedex __ mile final” that would inform SWA to not sit in position, unless they had a problem. I’m sure Austin has a radar display in the tower and should have sent Fedex around earlier.
When I was training to be an ATC’er, 42 years ago, I was told, “If you can’t see them, don’t clear them.” There was no pressing reason to rush the SWA out to the runway and depart him in front of the Fed heavy, regardless of where he thought SWA was. “One in, one out.” The FAA ATC creed is , ” Safe, orderly, expeditious.” This incident reversed that…
This may have been avoided if the controller had added “no delay” to the take off clearance.
Or a gentle reminder of the “cleared for TO, traffic on XX mile final” type.
The role of the SWA crew in the incident sparked the whole thing! Yet, according to the NTSB, the main causes were the controller’s incorrect assumption and lack of situational awareness, but the delay by the SWA crew was unexpected. This delay occurred because the SWA crew stopped on the runway for an engine check without notifying air traffic control (ATC). The proper procedure would have been to CLEARLY inform ATC about the need for extra time and not while on the numbers.
The role of the SWA crew in the incident sparked the whole thing!
but the delay by the SWA crew was unexpected. This delay occurred because the SWA crew stopped on the runway for an engine check without notifying air traffic control (ATC).
So YOU know where SWA was?? Wow! No one else did! How do you know he stopped on the runway? Was there anything in the NTSB report that says that?
This is the issue. How many times have controllers worked in WOXOF conditions with this and HEAVIER loads of traffic and NOT have sone this? This is common sense air traffic control.
I have not added or subtracted from the incident. As a 35 year controller, I knew better at year 1 that in the tower you dont issue instructions unless you KNOW where the aircraft is, in this case the controller made ZERO effort to acquire that information before issuing the take off clearance.
That is the ONLY point of failure. To blame this on lack of more equipment is an excuse, to say they weren’t trained is a terrible excuse. The simple failure of not KNOWING where the aircraft was is where the error occurred. Lack of care about the job should not be tolerated.
“So YOU know where SWA was??”
Watch the NTSB Animation Video.
The FAA was “invented” in 1958 because two airliners in day clear conditions “clunked” into each other over the Grand Canyon killing two planeloads of innocents. Their assigned #1 Mission is “Safety” which usually involves separating airplanes. They shed Mission #2 — promulgation — sadly. Here we are 66 years later with radar and computers and ADS-B and better standardization and training and more and the NTSB is blaming a “lack of technology” or lack of funds plus error made by a controller. Sumting is wong here !!
I asked questions about the training and hiring status of the local controller because I’d like to know. I ‘sense’ a difference in ATC service quality these days and I’d like to know. I wanna know what was done to that controller to get his attention?
I have had instances where a controller clearly hosed up his job and — on one occasion — got the number to the tower and “ate” him. If a pilot screws up, the FAA skewers him. WHAT was done to the controller here? And why did it happen. This has been unanswered thus far …
Why isn’t an Administrative Law Judge making mince meat out of the controller. Why isn’t The Administrator giving an award to the FedEx crew? Without them, this story woulda been a catastrophe.
I enjoy reading the news articles in AVweb simply as an intro to the comments. I have my own views on things and I believe they are well founded. Others however may agree with my wife that I am the only one who thinks so highly of my intellect.
I grew up in a world based on responsibility and meritocracy. You got ahead by showing up and measuring up. If you took on a task, you completed it and you exceeded expectations. I don’t believe that a “lack of technology” has a place among the contributing factors. A lack of ten sets of eyes in the tower, a lack of one hour spacing between flights, and a lack of one airport per airplane might as well be listed. None of those things are required for safe operations. Technology is wonderful as a back-up in case of a failure, but not having the technology is not the failure.
Thinking “if only we had xx, the person’s failure wouldn’t have mattered” leads to (or is brought about by) the mentality that it is not really the individual’s fault – of course they were going to fail, it happens to everyone – we shouldn’t be so demanding. This is a lazy and defeatist attitude that breeds mediocrity and irresponsibility. Those of us who recognize the difference between work ethics today and 30 years ago find it exasperating. I don’t care what color someone’s hair is, it doesn’t matter – except that they are very likely part of today’s world rather than my world, and today’s world is far more focused on participation trophies than dedication and responsibility.
Come to think of it, maybe we desperately DO need the technology…
Bottom line – there is no excuse for the mistake. Likely we will find that the controller was only giving half of their attention to the aircraft they were controlling. I can’t believe a mistake this glaring could be caused by poor training or excessive pressure.
On a separate note – while DEI is not the cause of mistakes or irresponsibility as Raf Sierra correctly makes clear, it is however one of several initiatives that have the appearance of creating distance between modern hiring practices and the need for individuals with a higher than usual set of intangible skills such as focus and dedication. While in theory DEI does not do this; I suspect that in reality it all depends on the practitioner.
“ Those of us who recognize the difference between work ethics today and 30 years ago find it exasperating.”
Those with the work ethics of 30 years ago are the ones teaching the work ethics of today.
Nope. The parents of the ones coming up are responsible for that. Not my job to teach work ethic. That comes with the person applying for the job.
Those that are working and training need to eliminate those that dont show the ethic that the job requires.
If they want a head set, there is one at McDonalds.
“ Nope. The parents of the ones coming up are responsible for that.”
And the parents don’t work? I imagine, those with the work ethics of 30 years ago were parents.
Hi all,
Thanks for the great posts. Robert, You see, all of us atc types from 30 years ago
have retired at 56, We are not training them, maybe at the academy. what is really scary is the BQ hires are now training the new hires.
We are in a world of hurt here. The only way out is to demand higher standards,
disipline, QA increased, and penalities for poor performance.
When i first read this incident and found out the kaus atc twr cleared swa for dept with a fed ex on a 3 mile final , during woxof conditions made my hair stand up.
holy cow!
the two in the tower do not need to be controlling any more traffic ever!
the basic lack of common sense is incredible!
today ‘ s pc world comes up with all the psuedo shit , expectation bias, no asde, swa didnt inform twr of delay etc. absolutely not swa fault, the twr should expect swa to take more time in the fog, and get a rolling call.
The fed ex pilot and fo deserve an award for averting a huge castrophe.
ive worked in a tower w heavy morning fog , routinely, heavy traffic, no asde no dbrite!
there are no excuses. these 2 duds couldnt seperate 2 airplanes on a quiet morning.
i hear from my atc friends still working. How could these people pass the academy?
the level of competent people, work ethic, self absorbed twits is unbelievable.
i was trained old school. a buck sergeant standing behind me, his cigarette ashes falling on my shoulders, kicking my chair, every other word started w the letter f.
nobody cared about my feelings, inner child, self esteem, or my experience that day.
only one thing mattered, do you want this job or not?
the standards and consequences need to be raised.
this is not a job for anyone.
get with it.
big signs entering the tracon
doors NO celphone use. they are to be turned off.
NCT had to come up with a policy get caught get a letter of reprimand. it was always the same few.
i guess now w the watches, in the dark, and hard to see.
The system has to get away from hiring and retireing waves.
Summers coming. peak traffic. buckle up.
michael.
“ i hear from my atc friends still working. How could these people pass the academy?
the level of competent people, work ethic, self absorbed twits is unbelievable”
Your work ethic didn’t rub off on your friends still in ATC? And their work ethic is not rubbing off on the new hires?
Or maybe, your work ethic did rub off on your friends still at ATC, and their work ethic is rubbing off on new hires?
“ i was trained old school. a buck sergeant standing behind me, his cigarette ashes falling on my shoulders, kicking my chair, every other word started w the letter f.
nobody cared about my feelings, inner child, self esteem, or my experience that day.
only one thing mattered, do you want this job or not?”
Was your Buck Sargent in charge of your training? Was he responsible to ensure that when you were signed off that you really knew what you were doing? He didn’t gun deck it did he?
Sounds like he taught you well.
But likely he was the last of a generation that actually cared about passing down knowledge, work ethic and ensured his trainees were properly prepared.
yes robert, the sargeant was in charge of my training.
yes he taught me well. and yes i passed down my work ethic, many others emulated it, but sadly they are retired now too.
what happened is the academy becamy lax. parents quit being parents. Dump it on the schools. Todays school is a partisipation trophy, everyone passes.
neighbor just retired LAUSD, 40% truancy rate, everyone passes. keep giving the answers till they pass. yelling and throwing stuff at teachers, abusive mean and distracting in class.cannont suspend or kick out of class. the kids know, and there is no consequence.
merit, politeness, teamwork, efficiency, ethics no longer taught.
Just a free for all.
we are in deep trouble in this country. no consequence for any bad behaviour.
“ yes i passed down my work ethic, many others emulated it, but sadly they are retired now too.”
If you passed down your work ethic, why is it no one now has your work ethic?
“parents quit being parents”
Are you a parent? I imagine, yes. So then, did you teach your kids to quit being parents? And did they teach their kids to hand out participation trophies?
For all the complaining about this generation, participation trophies and DEI, it was the previous generation that implemented these things.
And one more point.
To all the pilots out there. I hate to see you have to read this , see this , experience this.
Poor atc performance.
Please…. be very viligant. use caution. be very situation aware. trust your self. dont blindly follow along. We are in a new generation where the skill sets are not from yesteryear. If u see something say something. if you feel it is unsafe, say so. do not accept a clearance that you arent comfortable with. be your own guardian, use CRM,
and be on top of things.
it may get worse before it gets better.
be safe!
michael
retired faa
atc
To all the pilots out there, ATC or no ATC,
please…. be very vigilant. use caution. be very situation aware. Don’t blindly follow along.
You are the PIC no matter who is on the other end on the mic.
Wow! The gallery is buzzing. The comments cover a wide range of opinions on the editorial. While the focus was on the NTSB’s findings and the need for better safety technology and controller performance, the discussion expanded to broader critiques of the aviation industry, societal changes, and DEI in hiring. The high number of negative and divisive comments shows a need for more constructive dialogue.
Breakdown of Comment Quality:
• Excellent Comments: 8.82%
Insightful, balanced, and solution-oriented, contributing positively with constructive criticism and practical solutions.
• Good Comments: 8.82%
Valid points and practical suggestions but lacking depth or thoroughness.
• Mediocre Comments: 8.82%
Raise valid concerns or questions but lack detail or a constructive approach.
• Ugly Comments: 73.53%
Divisive, overly critical, scary, or having unfounded assumptions, detracting from constructive conversation.
However, I admit that accepting diverse commentary is like a wine tasting—each bottle offers a unique flavor profile, and together they create a rich and varied experience.
A number of commentators seem to believe that if only we did things the way they did them 30 years ago, all would be well.
According to an Airbus report, there were 0.8 fatal crashes per million flights globally in 1994; in 2022, there were 0.07.
None of which excuses the appalling failure by the ATCO(s) in this case. And of course, one could ask what was in the minds of the SW crew, or even why the FedEx crew who eventually saved the day didn’t do so sooner with an early GA.
Such questions are moot now. But it is certainly not moot that the “30 years ago” commentators were part of a system 11.4 times more dangerous than it currently is. When they present that as a virtue, it’s hard to give their views a respectful hearing.
Cavedweller, you are mostly correct: Here’s an Evaluation of Stakeholders and Their Contributing Factors based on the NTSB report. I used AI Problem Solving where the FAA, ATC, and the SWA flight crew were evaluated using a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the worst. Here’s a summary of their ratings and responsibilities. Looks like the FAA has the lowest score, followed by ATC:
1. FAA – Surface Detection Equipment:
• Rating: 2/10
• Responsibility: The FAA failed to ensure that Austin-Bergstrom International Airport was equipped with surface detection equipment, which is crucial for maintaining situational awareness in low-visibility conditions. This lack of equipment played a critical role in the incident. The FAA bears the burden of this failure, as the absence of this essential technology significantly compromised safety.
2. FAA – Low-Visibility Training:
• Rating: 3/10
• Responsibility: The FAA’s failure to provide adequate low-visibility training for air traffic controllers contributed to the incident. Proper training would have improved the controller’s situational awareness and decision-making under the foggy conditions present at the time. The FAA bears the burden of ensuring that controllers are well-prepared for such scenarios, and their lack of action in this area was a critical oversight.
3. Air Traffic Controller:
• Rating: 3-4/10
• Responsibility: The air traffic controller’s handling of the clearance and situational awareness were major contributing factors. The controller’s incorrect assumptions and failure to account for the low-visibility conditions were significant errors that exacerbated the situation. While the controller made critical errors, these were partly due to the lack of adequate equipment and training provided by the FAA.
4. SWA Crew:
• Rating: 4-5/10
• Responsibility: The SWA crew’s actions, particularly the delay and failure to communicate their need for additional time for an engine check, significantly contributed to the near-miss incident. While they adhered to procedural requirements, their lack of situational awareness and communication was a critical oversight.
Conclusion:
The incident was a result of multiple factors, with significant responsibility falling on the FAA and the air traffic controller. The FAA’s failure to provide necessary equipment and training significantly compromised safety and placed an undue burden on the controller. The controller’s incorrect assumptions and lack of situational awareness further exacerbated the situation. While the SWA crew also played a role due to their delay and communication issues, their procedural adherence was not the primary failing. To prevent future incidents, it is essential to address these gaps in technology and training.
For detailed insights, refer to the NTSB investigation report and the animation on their YouTube page (NTSB) (NTSB) (AeroTime) (NTSB).
ChatPT 4.0
The great thing about the comments section is I no longer feel like a grumpy old dude. There’s lots grumpier dudes than me out there.
In this case, this is an failure of ATC. If the SWA crew was told of the aircraft on short final it is also and mostly their fault. The pilot is the final arbiter of safe operation of the aircraft – not ATC. Decline the clearance if you’re not comfortable – and if this crew was told of the incoming they should have been uncomfortable. Yes: ATC should have known better than to clear that, but if the pilots knew and still accepted the clearance, they own responsibility as the final factor.
But since I don’t know that to be the situation, ATC should never have cleared this in these circumstances. Doesn’t matter if traffic was lined up waiting on the ground ( which it seems it wasn’t) wait for the space. You can’t make space by wanting it.
This is not a DEI failure. You will find no one who has a lower opinion of DEI than do I. It IS systemic racism codified. No rational person without prejudice could disagree. As such it is one of the most shameful things our society has ever been responsible for. But the hiring of people based on completely irrelevant characteristics is not what causes the issues. In the past people applied for ATC because they were interested in aviation. Now one applies because its a well paid gig that you can get. Not that some folks can’t learn. Of course it can be done – by some. But some folks are not going to have the mindset. And that’s what’s at play here. The controller who cleared this action has never internalized the value aviation places on good judgement. In western society these days everything has to happen instantly so that’s what our young people are used to. Aviation is the antithesis of that and it must continue to be. That disconnect provides current controllers a challenge previous generations never had. But one that needs to be overcome none the less.