The aviation industry stands at a crossroads, with technological advancements and economic pressures prompting discussions about reducing flight deck crew from two pilots to one. Proponents of single-pilot operations argue that automation and artificial intelligence can handle routine flight tasks, potentially cutting costs for airlines in an intensely competitive market.
The desire to transition to single-pilot flight decks overlooks a fundamental principle of aviation safety: redundancy. The two-pilot system is not designed for the everyday, uneventful flight but for the rare, critical moments when human judgment, coordination, and backup are indispensable.
Transitioning to single-pilot flight decks would undermine the safety net that has made
commercial aviation one of the safest modes of transportation, risking catastrophic
consequences in emergencies, medical crises, or pilot incapacitation. Maintaining two pilots in the flight deck is nonnegotiable if we believe it is important to continue to rely on a simple
safety principle in aviation, that backups for potential failures are a cornerstone of aviation
safety.
The Role of Redundancy in Aviation Safety
In aviation, we build in multiple layers of protection to ensure that as few single-point failure
potentials exist as possible that could lead to disaster. This principle is evident in aircraft design, with duplicate systems for critical components like engines, hydraulics, electrical systems, and communication and navigation equipment. The two-pilot flight deck is a human embodiment of this philosophy. While modern aircraft are equipped with sophisticated automation, no technology can fully replicate the dynamic problem-solving, situational awareness, and teamwork of two trained pilots working together.
The two-pilot system ensures that one pilot can focus on flying the aircraft while the other
handles additional tasks, such as communication, navigation, troubleshooting, or emergencies. This division of labor is not as critical on a routine flight, where automation can manage many functions. However, the system is designed for the unexpected—those rare but high-stakes scenarios where split-second decisions and coordinated efforts can mean the difference between a safe landing and a tragedy. Reducing the flight deck crew to a single pilot eliminates this critical backup, leaving less margin for error when unforeseen events occur.
Emergencies Demand a Two-Pilot Team
Emergencies in aviation are infrequent but require precise and rapid responses. When an
aircraft experiences a mechanical failure, such as an engine fire or hydraulic system
malfunction, the workload in the flight deck spikes dramatically. One pilot is typically tasked with “flying the plane,” while the other works checklists, helps problem-solve, and may take over communications and navigation duties. The separation of duties allows better focus on emergency tasks and spreads the workload. In these cases, doing this can be the critical
difference between task saturation and a negative outcome if one pilot had to do it all and
successfully bring the aircraft back to a safe landing. This division of duties is not a luxury—it’s a necessity.
Consider the case of Qantas Flight 32 in 2010, when an Airbus A380 suffered a catastrophic
engine failure shortly after takeoff from Singapore. The flight deck crew of five, including two
pilots and additional flight officers, worked together to manage a cascade of system failures, run extensive checklists, and safely land the aircraft. While this example involves a larger crew, it underscores the importance of having multiple trained professionals to handle complex emergencies. In a single-pilot scenario, the lone pilot would likely have been overwhelmed, forced to juggle flying, troubleshooting, and communication without support. Even with advanced automation, the cognitive load would be immense, increasing the risk of errors.
Checklists, a cornerstone of aviation safety, are designed for two pilots. One pilot reads and
executes the steps while the other monitors and verifies. This process ensures accuracy under pressure. A single pilot running a checklist alone, whether on paper or in a digital panel system, is more likely to miss critical steps or misinterpret instructions, especially in a high-stress situation. The 2009 crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407, where pilot error contributed to a stall, highlighted the dangers of inadequate crew coordination. While automation has improved since then, it cannot replace the human element of cross-checking and collaboration.
Medical Emergencies in the Cabin
Beyond mechanical issues, medical emergencies in the cabin are another scenario where two pilots are indispensable. When a passenger suffers a heart attack, stroke, or other life-
threatening condition, the flight crew coordinates a response. One pilot typically continues to fly the aircraft, maintaining safety and adhering to ATC instructions, while the other communicates with cabin crew, assesses the situation, and coordinates with ground-based medical services. This split of crew duties would not be possible in a single-pilot environment.
In a single-pilot operation, the lone pilot would face an impossible choice: focus on flying or
manage the emergency. Diverting attention to the medical crisis could compromise flight safety, while ignoring the situation could delay critical care for the passenger. Historical examples demonstrate the value of two pilots in such cases. In 2015, a United Airlines flight from Houston to London diverted to Newfoundland when a passenger suffered a medical emergency. The flight deck crew’s ability to split responsibilities—one flying, the other coordinating—ensured a safe landing and timely medical attention. A single pilot would lack this flexibility, potentially leading to delayed responses or unsafe decisions.
Pilot Incapacitation: A Rare but Real Risk
One of the most compelling arguments for two pilots is the risk of pilot incapacitation. Pilots, like all humans, are susceptible to sudden medical events such as heart attacks, seizures, or severe illness. While rare, these incidents can render a pilot unable to perform their duties, leaving the aircraft without a capable operator. The two-pilot system ensures that the second pilot can take control, stabilize the situation, and safely land the aircraft.
Historical incidents highlight the importance of this redundancy. In 2015, the first officer of a
Germanwings flight experienced a medical emergency, but the captain was able to assume
control and land safely. On March 22, 2023, Southwest Airlines Flight 6013 from Las Vegas to Columbus, Ohio, faced a crisis when the captain suffered a medical emergency shortly after takeoff. The first officer swiftly took control, declared an emergency, and safely returned the aircraft to Las Vegas, with assistance from an off-duty pilot on board who handled radio communications. The captain was attended by a flight attendant and later received medical care. This incident underscores the critical importance of two-crew operations in aviation safety. The second pilot’s ability to seamlessly assume control ensured the aircraft’s safe landing, protecting passengers and crew. Two-crew systems provide essential redundancy, allowing for immediate response to incapacitation events, which, though rare, can occur without warning. Robust training and standard operating procedures further enhance this safety net, ensuring effective management of emergencies.
Automation advocates argue that remote piloting or AI could step in if a pilot becomes
incapacitated. However, these solutions are unproven in real-world scenarios. Remote piloting relies on uninterrupted communication links, which can fail due to weather, technical issues, or cyberattacks. AI systems, while advanced, lack the contextual judgment and adaptability of a human pilot. Entrusting an aircraft with hundreds of passengers to untested technology in a crisis is a gamble that aviation cannot afford.
Pilot Mental Health and the Critical Role of Two-Pilot Crews in Preventing Suicidal Acts
While even more rare, but supremely catastrophic, would be the potential of a pilot who wanted to commit suicide with passengers onboard. The opportunity to execute such an event is significantly lessened with two crew in the flight deck. Pilot mental health has emerged as a critical concern in aviation, with rare but devastating cases highlighting the risks of psychological distress in the cockpit. The two-pilot system is a vital defense in such scenarios, significantly reducing the opportunity for a single pilot to intentionally crash an aircraft. Having a second pilot in the flight deck ensures oversight, intervention, and redundancy, protecting passengers and crew from catastrophic outcomes.
The tragic case of Germanwings Flight 9525 in 2015 underscores the importance of this
safeguard. The copilot, struggling with severe mental health issues, locked the captain out of the cockpit and deliberately crashed the plane into the Alps, killing all 150 people on board. This incident, though an outlier, revealed the vulnerability of a single pilot in control without immediate oversight. A second crew member in the cockpit could have intervened, either by recognizing warning signs, challenging erratic behavior, or physically preventing the act. Most airlines now have a flight attendant enter the flight deck if a captain or first officer must leave temporarily.
Beyond direct intervention, the two-pilot system fosters an environment of mutual monitoring
and support. Pilots work closely together, often developing professional rapport that enables
them to notice subtle changes in behavior or mood. A second pilot can detect signs of
distress—such as agitation, withdrawal, or uncharacteristic decision-making—that might go
unnoticed in a single-pilot scenario. This informal peer monitoring is not about mistrust but about leveraging human connection to enhance safety. In a single-pilot cockpit, there is no one to observe or question the pilot’s state of mind, leaving a gap in the safety net. The two-pilot cockpit remains an essential fail-safe, ensuring that no single individual has unchecked control. By maintaining this redundancy, the industry upholds its commitment to safety, protecting against the rare but catastrophic possibility of a suicidal pilot. The second pilot is not just a backup for technical tasks but a human safeguard against the unpredictable
complexities of mental health.
The Fallacy of the “Everyday Flight” Argument
Proponents of single-pilot operations often focus on the “everyday flight,” where automation
handles most tasks, and the pilot’s role is primarily supervisory. They argue that one pilot,
supported by advanced systems, is sufficient for routine operations, and cost savings could be significant. However, this perspective misrepresents the purpose of the two-pilot system. The second pilot is not there for the 99% of flights that proceed without incident but for the 1% where their presence is critical. Aviation safety is not about optimizing for the average day—it’s about preparing for the worst.
The industry’s stellar safety record, with global accident rates below 1 per million flights, is a
testament to this approach. Reducing crew to cut costs prioritizes short-term financial gains over long-term safety, a tradeoff that could erode public trust in air travel. Passengers expect that every possible precaution is taken to ensure their safety, and a single-pilot flight deck would signal a departure from this commitment. Moreover, the cost-saving argument is overstated. Pilot salaries, while significant, are a fraction of an airline’s operating expenses, which include fuel, maintenance, and aircraft leasing to name just a few. The financial impact of a single accident caused by an overwhelmed pilot or automation failure would far outweigh any savings, not to mention the human cost.
The Broader Aviation System: Primary and Backup
The two-pilot system is part of a broader aviation framework that prioritizes redundancy at every level. Air traffic control provides multiple layers of oversight, with controllers cross-checking each other’s work. Maintenance crews operate under strict protocols, with inspections and signoffs by multiple technicians. Even cabin crew are trained to handle emergencies in teams, ensuring no single point of failure. Reducing the flight deck crew to one pilot would create a weak link in this chain, undermining the system’s resilience.
This principle extends beyond aviation. Industries like healthcare and nuclear power rely on
redundant systems and human oversight to prevent catastrophes. In a hospital operating room, multiple professionals monitor the patient and equipment, just as two pilots monitor the aircraft. The aviation industry’s safety culture, honed over decades, should not be dismantled for unproven technological promises or short-term cost reductions.
The push for single-pilot flight decks ignores the aviation industry’s foundational commitment to safety through redundancy. Two pilots are not a luxury but a critical safeguard for emergencies, medical crises, and pilot incapacitation. The aviation system’s strength lies in its layered approach, with primary and backup support at every level. Dismantling this framework for cost savings risks catastrophic consequences, undermining the trust that passengers place in air travel.
As technology evolves, the industry must integrate it thoughtfully, enhancing rather than
replacing human expertise. The two-pilot flight deck remains a proven model, delivering
unparalleled safety in an unpredictable world. Airlines, regulators, and the public must reject the allure of single-pilot operations and reaffirm their commitment to the redundancy that has made aviation a model of safety.
The skies are safer with two pilots, and that must never change when it comes to carrying hundreds of passengers in the back of the aircraft.
Agreed Jason. . Cost cuts don’t justify the risk. Two pilots are essential for safety, judgment, and backup in critical moments. Things are complicated and extensive. Automation helps but can’t replace human oversight. Redundancy must stay.
Thanks for putting this together, it’s a thoughtful, well-grounded piece.
I agree. Two crew installed in the cockpit is the way to go.
However, I heard all the same arguments when the two-crew cockpit on the 747-400 was introduced to reduce the payroll obligation and overhead of a third crew member. The operations community lost that spat, and the financial and operational benefits promised by further reducing the crew to one (and, ultimately, zero) will compel the decision makers to ensure that they win this debate, too.
As for safety, well of course all corporations prefer safety. But they tend to prefer money even more. If we look at the responses of large corporations to obvious safety deficiencies, the issue is usually resolved in favor of profit. If anybody from Union Carbide is in this thread, please do chime in.
The remaining crew member has a choice: resign, or bend over and take it. I hate giving up before starting, but in this case I think that it is justified. The decision has been made. The question has moved on to how it is implemented.
Single pilot operations are fundamentally unsustainable and only serve as a bridge to unpiloted operations. You have the pilots you trust that start with, and you have almost no ability to build up new ones. That process is baked into the current pie: you start as a first officer and learn the ropes before moving to the left seat. How will that occur when there’s only one seat? At some point, your current roster retires and you either remove the seat or replace them with completely unknown, inexperienced people who don’t meet your original assumptions about the quality of pilots you’re asking to do this by themselves.
Curious why no one is similarly advocating for single engine aircraft. Think of the savings!
The same is true of firemen. They’re not paid to perfect their chili recipes or sleep in the firehouse (among other cliches). They’re paid to save people’s lives.
It seems like most advocates of single-pilot cockpits are focusing on where the most time and money is spent, not on the core mission - to get passengers safely to their destination.
Agree on all points but as Boeing, for example, has so aptly demonstrated, money is more important than safety.
It also seems like here as in many other life safety critical careers (medicine, engineering, …) that years working with a number of more experienced practitioners is essential to build skill and judgement with a safety net in place.
The 747-400 series replaced the earlier -100 /200/300 models. These had a Flight Engineer to monitor the 976 dials & switches for the systems and controls. I flew 100 & 200s, then converted to the -436 on intro into BA, subsequently flew the -412 & 412F for SIA, the automation meant only 365 switches & dials plus a vast improvement in auto flight with Cat3B limits for autoland. While flying the 100/200 the FltEng was a valuable and valued member of my crew, but no longer required on the 400 as there was now nothing for him to do. Flying from JFK-AMS with a new and able young F/O we had a medical emergency requiring decision and action just after crossing 30W into Shanwick control. My F/O flew the airplane impeccably while I dealt with the diversion into Glasgow being the nearest major hospital and which I knew well from past years. The rest was a swift diversion with priority landing at Glasgow Abbotsincmh and a safe casevac for the injured cabin crew. Two pillots were fully occupied in the arrival followed by a turnaround for the first ever SIA 747-400 to visit, make new load sheet,refuel , file a flight plan & deice all took the two of us 45minutes busy time followed by continuing the service to AMS. Not a passenger companied at our late arrival. A single crew could not have accomplished this task. Equally consider a 15hour transPacific from HKG-SFO, single pilot, plus a magic monitor from some remote person on the ground. How to deal with a cabin pressure failure, an emergency descent to FL100, then what, no fuel to continue to destination, divert where? Midway, Guam ? with 430 souls on board, just one pilot to deal with this? If the accountant department consider 2 to drive too expensive, consider a hull loss over the middle of the ocean.
I agree there is really no good argument for single pilot operations. If you are willing to compromise safety for cost savings, the logical conclusion would be no humans in the cockpit. Having just one is the worst of both options: single point of failure, plus the remaining potential for human error - a significant factor in most accidents.
C.
Not if, but when.
It’ll start at first with the freighters, but single pilot 121 ops will come — whether we like it or not. And after a trial period, soon to follow will be semi or fully autonomous operations — ala Global Hawk.
I see there’s lotsa “Luddites” out there … so, let the “hate mail” begin …
The author makes a declarative statement like “The two-pilot system is not designed for the everyday, uneventful flight but for the rare, critical moments when human judgment, coordination, and backup are indispensable” then walks it back somewhat in the concluding paragraph by describing the team concept in other contexts. But the two-pilot system drastically decreases everyday pilot error for all flights, not just the outliers.
Yes, challenge-and-response checklists require two pilots but that’s not what I’m referring to. Both pilots check the logbook for discrepancies before every flight. Both pilots read any applicable MELs. Both pilots review the flight plan in the FMS when it’s first entered and every time it’s changed, even slightly. Both pilots agree and acknowledge every time the state of the aircraft changes, whether it’s as simple as a temporary vector, an altitude change, or a full route clearance. Both pilots brief procedures, particularly critical ones such as instrument approaches and non-standard engine-out procedures. And the pilot monitoring is actively checking the pilot flying at all times to make sure the pilot flying is actually performing as planned.
Single pilot ops, done well, are reasonably safe but aren’t as safe as two pilot ops no matter how good the engineering gets. Individual pilots slip up; I do it every time I fly whether it’s alone or as part of a trained crew. The difference is that as part of a crew, most of these slip-ups are trapped before actually acting on them, then the ones acted on are mitigated in real time before making any operational impact. Until we have HAL in the right seat able to say, “I’m sorry, Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that [because you’re about to screw up]”, then two pilots are the only way to go.
I agree with the need for two pilots over single pilot and automation. I find it interesting that people who support single pilot ops cite the expense savings and the highly competitive airline industry as reasons for the change. I admit that a second pilot is not a trivial expense, but compared with fuel costs, aircraft purchase/leasing and maintenance, it is not a major driving force. Besides, if all airlines have to maintain the two pilot system, they are all on the same level playing field expense wise. Having said all that, I too, foresee that freight operations will be the camel’s nose under the tent with regard to single pilot ops.
Take a look at the marine industry. Modern ships are competently manoevered by one person having the con of the ship including docking and departures. No regulatory agency would allow single person control of a cargo ship or cruise ship. An additional number of crew must be onboard at their working stations when the vessel is at sea. The crew complement is regulated by the registry authority taking into account the normal practices of the venture plus the ability to respond effectively to emergencies such as fire and flooding. The crew members are licenced by the governing state for the different tasks required to be performed such as machinery control, firefighting, passenger control as well as navigation and communications. Without adequate crew no agency would extend insurance coverage for the venture. A 2 person cockpit together with adequate cabin crew for passenger flights is the only logical and legal choice.
Only aircraft emergencies support your argument for two pilots, and that won’t last long. Incapacitation is already being dealt with by emergency landing tech, proven by Garmin in GA aircraft. Suicidal pilots argue for zero humans in the cockpit, not two. Cabin emergencies can be dealt with by cabin crew, you don’t need a pilot.
Pilots have made themselves a target by using their monopoly union position to raise their cost to the point that every airline has to find a way to cut it. No amount of whining or complaining about safety while striking for ever higher wages will make any difference. Abolish the union and artificial supply restrictions like 1500 hours for second seat, letting wages find a competitive level, and watch the pressure evaporate.
Not a cogent reply to this issue. Should you take the time to consider the complex issues beginning with regulatory, crew worktimes, emergency response, insurance coverage and loss expenses your view may be different. The analogy to marine transportation is well established over centuries in the modern era regarding coverage and compensation when adverse events happen. Single person point of failure is unsustainable in today’s complex transportation systems, Too much money is at stake and social conscience will not accept such shortcomings. If you choose to invest in insurance for such a risky venture with no redundancy on the flight deck then you might be lucky but I think the status quo will prevail.
I wonder what dollar value is being guesstimated for the first hull loss. It must be less than they think they will save on crew pay…
We have so many sectors in our lives which are subject to the rules of blind profitability. If course the cost of loss of heartbeat is simply another calculated factor. In some of our “highly developed” countries, it is no longer possible to get professional medical care, professional legal representation or professional anything. You either slap a unlimited credit-card on the table and find pro’s who will use it, or you simply experience trash.
One doctor recently told me that he forsees the complete collapse of our medical/ pharmaceutical sectors within 2-3 years. After living my own odyssey for the last 6 months, I don’t think it will be that long.
Single Pilot Airliners are a complete NOGO.
We’ll see it being tested pretty soon and more people will work for free or half the standard salary.
For every example you give (many of them - Colgan, Germanwings- support the argument for more automation and less pilot authority) i can give 2 where a next-gen autopilot would hv brought all pax home safely. Through progress in engine reliability and avionics (still some way to go), pilots have become the weakest link in the safety chain. Lets analyze all accidents and divide them into “pure technical” vs “pilot played a role”. There is bias within the pilot community, and I understand, but we are pilots, driven by facts, instruments, information to steer our reaction, not by pride or greed. Also : consider the tech of tomorrow, not yesterday. There are many less-than-perfect landings, a computer has the power to make every landing a greaser. Why not ?
I know I have been criticized for my stand on SMS, this subject is a perfect example. Going to single pilot pt 121 operations would go against any of the risks SMS is supposed to mitigate. So my opinion on SMS hasn’t changed. With all the talk of single pilot pt121 ops, it just reinforces my belief that SMS is just another fad just like ISO9000 was in the 1990’s.
I agree with Jeff_G. The idea that 99% of flights would go just fine single pilot is a weird point to make. As an FO I am correcting things and being corrected, like misheard radio calls or interpretations of charts and procedures, or forgetting to change autopilot modes. This kind of thing happens on probably 20-30% of flights.
If not caught these mistakes are a small safety risk which could balloon into an overloaded pilot. But not only that, they would decrease the efficiency of the ATC system, which is at carrying capacity currently. Anything that decreases that efficiency is a cost, and an enormous one for airlines.
Between the decreased efficiency of ATC and the higher chance of bent metal and delays, and the higher training costs of captains, I’m not convinced that removing the FO would actually be a cost savings in the long run.
I strongly agree regulations should require 2 human pilots for scheduled commercial (airlines) operations. In the future automation MAY be able to take the place of a human pilot. However, the cost should never be the driving reason to replace any aircrew. The overriding priority for automation over humans should be for SAFETY.
The loss in redundancy going from 3 to 2 is not the same as going from 2 to 1.
I agree almost completely. But one bit I have to quibble with. Most people don’t understand how unbelievably safe this system is. The same people (almost all of us, even in this forum) accept forty thousand highway deaths per year in the US and don’t even discuss it. If we went from the recent record of, statistically speaking, average around 12 deaths per year in the lower 48, scheduled 121 domestic passenger flights over the past decade, to higher numbers what would happen? I’m not convinced that if that number went up to say, average 50 or 100 fatalities per year, that anyone would really be up in arms about it. Especially if airlines kept making, or ummm… started making more money. Maybe people would just accept a slightly lower standard of safety. I hope not. But they might…