When Cessna introduced its upcoming Model 162 Skycatcher at EAA AirVenture in 2007, the airplane was pitched as a return to fundamentals. Cessna, which for decades anchored the U.S. training fleet with the 150 and later the 152, said the Skycatcher would offer a simpler, less expensive way to bring new pilots into aviation under the then-new light sport aircraft rules. The goal was straightforward: lower acquisition and operating costs, streamlined certification requirements and an airplane purpose-built for flight schools.
For a time, the plan appeared to be working. Early interest was strong, deposits accumulated quickly and Cessna said it had secured more than 1,000 orders. The Skycatcher was positioned as a practical response to declining pilot starts and rising costs across general aviation.
Less than a decade later, the Skycatcher disappeared from Cessna’s product lineup. Fewer than 200 airplanes were delivered, dozens of completed but unsold airframes were retained for parts, and the program ended quietly, leaving behind questions about why one of the industry’s most established manufacturers was unable to make light sport aviation work at scale.
A Training Airplane for a New Category
The Skycatcher program took shape after the FAA created the sport pilot certificate and the LSA category, which were intended to reduce barriers to entry for recreational flying. Under the new framework, pilots could train and fly without holding a traditional medical certificate, and manufacturers could certify airplanes through industry consensus standards rather than the FAA’s full Part 23 process.
Cessna viewed the new category as an opportunity to reestablish a foothold at the low end of the market. The company said the Skycatcher would be affordable to buy and operate, rugged enough for repeated training cycles and simple enough to appeal to first-time owners. Initial pricing targets were set near $100,000, well below the cost of a new Skyhawk.
From the outset, however, Cessna acknowledged that meeting those targets would be difficult if the airplane was to be built entirely in the United States. The company ultimately chose Shenyang Aircraft Corp. in China as its manufacturing partner, citing lower production costs and the company’s experience supplying components to major aerospace firms.
Under the arrangement, Cessna retained responsibility for design, engineering, flight testing and certification, while Shenyang assembled the airframes. Completed airplanes were shipped to the United States for final assembly, inspection and delivery.
The decision drew criticism from some corners of the aviation community, but Cessna said offshore production was necessary to achieve the Skycatcher’s price point. At the time, company executives emphasized that quality oversight and compliance verification would remain under Cessna’s control.
Flight Testing Reveals Deeper Problems
The Skycatcher’s development program soon encountered difficulties. Early prototypes flew in 2007 and 2008, but spin testing exposed shortcomings in the airplane’s recovery characteristics. Two test aircraft were lost, including one during aggressive spin evaluations conducted at aft center-of-gravity limits.
Cessna said the maneuvers exceeded what LSAs were required to demonstrate, but the incidents nonetheless prompted design changes. Engineers modified the tail by increasing vertical surface area, adding a ventral fin and adjusting control surface travel to improve spin recovery margins.
Those changes had consequences beyond flight characteristics. Additional structure added weight, and the redesign rippled through production planning. Aircraft built in China had to be modified after arrival in the United States, contributing to delays and inefficiencies in the delivery pipeline.
By the time the Skycatcher achieved ASTM compliance in 2009, the airplane entering service differed meaningfully from the one originally announced. It was heavier, more complex and costlier to produce, complicating efforts to hold the line on pricing.
Costs Rise as Orders Fade
Pricing emerged as the program’s central challenge. Early buyers were promised airplanes priced near $110,000, but as production costs mounted and volumes failed to materialize, Cessna adjusted its strategy. The base price rose incrementally at first, then sharply.
By 2011, Cessna increased the Skycatcher’s price to roughly $149,000, adding equipment such as avionics and interior features as standard. Company officials said the changes reflected both customer preferences and the need to make the program financially sustainable.
The increase placed the Skycatcher near the top of the LSA price range and undermined the original rationale for overseas production. Competing LSAs offered similar performance, lighter empty weights and, in many cases, more refined interiors at comparable prices.
Flight schools and individual buyers reassessed their commitments. Order holders withdrew, and dealers reported difficulty convincing customers that the Skycatcher’s limitations under light sport rules aligned with their expectations. The order book that once exceeded 1,000 positions steadily eroded.
Regulatory and Market Headwinds
The Skycatcher also faced broader challenges beyond Cessna’s direct control. The surge in pilot training anticipated after the introduction of sport pilot privileges never fully materialized. While LSAs found niches among recreational pilots and specialized schools, they did not fundamentally change the economics of flight training.
Regulatory evolution further complicated the picture. Although the FAA periodically discussed expanding LSA privileges and performance limits, substantive changes came slowly. In Europe, certification and operational differences made introducing it there at the time problematic.
At one point, the company explored transitioning the Skycatcher out of the light sport category and pursuing primary category certification to broaden its appeal. Those plans were announced publicly but were never implemented.
In 2012, Cessna issued a mandatory service bulletin addressing cracks discovered in wing attach points during cyclic testing. The bulletin required structural reinforcement on early airplanes, adding labor and downtime for operators. Cessna covered the cost, but the episode added to perceptions that the program remained unsettled.
An Orderly Exit
By 2013, the program’s trajectory was clear. Cessna CEO Scott Ernest told reporters the Skycatcher had “no future,” later saying the business model did not work. Sales were halted in early 2014, and the airplane was removed from Cessna’s website and dealer lineup.
Roughly 80 unsold aircraft were retained for use as spare parts, and fewer than 200 Skycatchers were ultimately delivered. The broader LSA market showed little reaction. Other manufacturers continued production and flight schools adjusted with alternative aircraft.
The final chapter came in 2016, when photographs surfaced showing remaining Skycatcher airframes being dismantled after salvageable components were removed. Cessna confirmed the action, saying the parts would support the existing fleet.
Lessons From a Short-Lived Program
In retrospect, the Skycatcher was not widely viewed as a poor-flying airplane. Operators generally described it as predictable, economical and suitable for basic training. But the airplane arrived at a moment when cost pressures, regulatory uncertainty and market fragmentation left little margin for error.
Cessna overestimated the size of the LSA training market and underestimated how difficult it would be to deliver a truly low-cost airplane, even with offshore manufacturing. Design changes, production inefficiencies and rising prices steadily eroded the value proposition.
For Cessna, the Skycatcher’s demise marked a rare retreat from entry-level training, a segment the company once defined. For the industry, it put a spotlight on the limits of regulatory reform as a catalyst for growth.
The Skycatcher was intended to make flying more accessible. Instead, it became a reminder that simplifying the rules does not necessarily simplify the business of building and selling airplanes.
All the points brought up by the author is exactly why I feel that the recent changes in the light sport and recreational aircraft will not result in any increase in the pilot count or aviation activity.
You are born as a low-cost designer and manufacturer, you never turn into one.
Look at other industries, or airlines.
Remember Bede the designer of the Yankee Trainer? Remember how many crashed due to an inability to recover from a stall? There is a story there. Might deregulation and human greed cast an illusion on cheap Charlie thinking as far as flight safety goes?
I have never flown a Yankee, but I’ve talked with CFIs who have and while this isn’t a definitive survey, the general consensus was that the Yankee was a ‘fun’ airplane to fly and very responsive. It could recover from a stall much like any GA aircraft, but a fully developed spin was unrecoverable. The CFIs differed on the ‘why’ but most indicated both a lack of rudder authority and the fuel tank system in the wings. Apparently the fuel tended to move toward the wing tips during spin rotation and the rotational inertia in a fully developed spin inhibited or prevented recovery. One CFI said that during slow flight and stall maneuvers in the Yankee he kept his feet at the ready position…
Also, and this is a single data point, the flight training and rental activity has significantly increased at our local airport since MOSAIC was enacted in October. It used to be easy to schedule our LSAs and C-172s, but now we have to plan ahead, often by several days. I hope it continues!
Be safe out there!
This is one of the best summaries of the 162 program I’ve read to date. The Scott Ernest price hike from $115K to nearly $150 killed nearly half of the 800+ orders overnight. The overweight O200 engine doomed the useful load from the beginning especially when compared to the competition using a Rotax powerplant. The authors final three observations sum up where we are in aviation and see it now playing out in the AAM / Urban Mobility movement - regardless of the technology and deep pockets involved.
I see no mention in this article or the comments of useful load and payload with full fuel. If I remember correctly, other news sources said that payload with full fuel was a bit over 300 pounds, making this plane useless for (legal) dual instruction. Also, I don’t believe the 162 Skycatcher was approved for intentional spins. Is my memory correct?
Dismantled is a poor choice of words for the remaining Skycatchers. The original article had “scrapped” which better captured the utter destruction of the remaining airframes, undoubtedly for vindictive tax purposes. The weak point is the nose gear and firewall and it’s a shame those parts weren’t saved. The new leadership was looking at the millions of dollars in the bizjet crowd and walked away from Cessna’s plane for the average pilot heritage. The dropping of the primary category work was a mistake and a throwing away of the intellectual property they had worked hard to gain. Had they increased the useful load, it would have gained a market. One other point: Many of us saw the original rudder design and thought that the lack of area below the elevator and small size would lead to spin issues. We eyeball engineers were right. Not the first time a stylist had the better of the aerodynamic team.
You’re right. The original design had a Rotax engine and greater useful load. It has a placard against intentional spins.
Having 50 hours in a Cessna 150 and 850 hours in a Cessna 172; I am certain both the Cessnas 152 and 162 are wonderful aircraft. Used Cessna 150s are always available for sale. Meaning to me, both the 152 and the 162 will always be the step child of the 150. And specifically, probably no way exists to compete with the Cessna 150 in the market place because there are so many of them. I believe over 20,000? And Cessna 172s, over 30,000? At used costs that are a fraction of a new airplane cost. And the old airplanes, if have gone through yearly annual inspections, are probably safer or as safe as any new aircraft. And the exercise Cessna went through with the 162 appears to prove that. The training market for starter aircraft is well suited by used aircraft and it is highly unlikely any manufacturer will challenge the used aircraft market; where the aircraft value is unexcelled. Though, in the last 7 to 8 years, the price of used aircraft has doubled or more. Meaning to me, used aircraft will be around forever.
Had Cessna just brought back the 152 in lightweight composite materials, and made it here in America, they might have had something.
The only certified engine at the time suitable for LSA aircraft (limited to 1320# GW) was the Rotax. Both Continental O-200 (used in the 150 & 162) and even heavier Lycoming O-235 (used in the 152) were mismatches for LSAs. They were about 30% heavier and burned at least 25% more fuel. Cessna had hoped flight school familiarity with the O-200 would make a difference but in the end, the limited useful load impacted the training market from an instructor/student pairing and the endurance standpoint. Test airplanes on experimental airworthiness regularly flew around 1400#+ which had little effect on performance but the extra capability made the 162 shine. Had Cessna been granted the 1420#GW exemption given to amphibious LSAs, the history of the airplane may have been significantly different.
I believe the Wichita Eagle newspaper reported it accurately describing how the shipping containers of airplanes waiting reassembly in Independence, KS were bulldozed intact- none of the engines, props, avionics, seats, or even wheels and tires were removed. And I believe they even had the gruesome pictures to go with it.
If you design an airplane that has been announced to cost $100,000 and the price turns out to be 50% more at $149,000 you have missed your price point and lost your projected market. Even more critical was to design an airplane for student training which was, at least initially, hard to get out of a spin. This could have been fatal to students if not corrected, since they do not get hands-on spin experience in the training course. If you want that training, you have to get it in an aerobatic aircraft, or, a glider. Also, there are prospective buyers who do not want an airplane manufactured in China, where every devious scheme possible is used to cut costs. There are airplane manufacturers like GoGetAir and Pipestrel in Europe which are a fraction of the size of Cessna but manufacture airplanes that are offering 2 seat aircraft that incorporate light weight new tech materials and designs and have better fuel economy and performance. Clearly, being bigger is not always being better.