The FAA published a plan Friday to hire 351 aviation safety inspectors and 90 aviation safety engineers in fiscal year 2026 as part of its latest 10-year Aviation Safety Oversight and Certification Workforce Plan.
According to the FAA’s fiscal year 2026-2035 plan, the agency had 7,477 aviation safety employees as of Jan. 10, with aviation safety inspectors and engineers making up 64 percent of its operations-funded workforce and 87 percent of its safety-critical workforce. The agency reported hiring 338 inspectors in fiscal year 2025 while losing 424, resulting in a year-over-year decline in inspector headcount. Regarding engineering staff, the FAA hired 60 and lost 91 during the same period.
The plan also points to several areas expected to affect FAA staffing needs over the next decade, including drones, advanced air mobility, light-sport aircraft rule changes, artificial intelligence, software assurance and data analytics. The FAA said it expects inspector headcount to grow from 4,086 in fiscal year 2025 to 4,888 by fiscal year 2035, while engineer staffing is forecast to increase from 728 to 810 over the same period. The plan was submitted under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, and Sections 430 and 431 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.
When Oversight Becomes Optional
America’s aviation system remains the safest in the world-but it is increasingly being protected by a regulator that is seeing less and assuming more. The Federal Aviation Administration is quietly shifting away from the hands-on oversight that built its reputation, replacing direct observation with paperwork, process, and trust. That might sound like modernization. In reality, it’s substitution.
Recent findings from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General make the problem difficult to ignore. The FAA faces inspector shortages severe enough that it cannot complete all required safety inspections. In some cases, virtual reviews are being used in place of in-person oversight-not as a best practice, but as a necessity. In one audited office, staffing vacancies approached one-third of authorized positions. In another, just four inspectors were responsible for overseeing more than 500 aircraft. That isn’t oversight-it’s triage. In too many offices, the management has virtually no experience in what their inspectors oversee and can’t understand inspectors’ complaints of too little physical inspection and too much paperwork auditing.
Aviation safety doesn’t fail all at once. It erodes quietly. Maintenance errors are rarely obvious. A component improperly lubricated, a bearing installed incorrectly, a record signed but not verified-these are the kinds of problems that only show up when someone is physically present to see them. Paperwork reflects what is reported, not necessarily what is done.
The same blind spot exists in the air. The 2025 mid-air collision over the Potomac exposed a different assumption: that systems behave exactly as designed. They don’t.
Altimeters operate within allowable tolerances. So does the equipment used to test them. In tightly constrained airspace, the difference between “safe” and “unsafe” altitude can fall within that margin of error. If systems aren’t designed and continuously validated-with that reality in mind, risk accumulates in ways that are difficult to detect until it is too late.
None of this means aviation is unsafe today. It means the margin for error is narrowing.
The FAA’s challenge is not a lack of tools. Safety management systems and data analytics have value. But they were never intended to replace independent verification. A system depending on operators to identify their own deficiencies-without consistent external validation-is a system that will eventually miss something important.
At the same time, the agency’s priorities have shifted. Billions are spent on infrastructure and modernization, while the most basic function of a safety regulator-direct observation of real-world operations-struggles with staffing, time, and experience. The result is an oversight model that is increasingly remote, increasingly procedural, and less able to detect problems before they become incidents.
For decades, aviation safety rested on a simple principle: trust but verify. The FAA is still trusting. It is verifying less.
That’s not a crisis yet. But it is how one begins.
This is spot on ^^^^^^
Former Air Carrier Operations Inspector 1825, POI, APM
A microcosm where aviation inspection overlaps with engineering is in FAA Certification Flight Test. The test pilots and flight test engineers in this very small group cover all US & foreign aircraft certification activities- all categories & classes. Staffing has fallen to just over half the allotted capacity causing backlogs in cert activity, stress, and further retention problems. Cross country travel demands to cover all testing activities have increased lost time spent on travel and dead time in airports decreasing efficiency and productivity. Since flight test is usually the final step in development and certification where compliance and safety are held to account, this is a very valuable group within the FAA. Yet, the ability of this group to do their job is in a tightening spiral but no one in upper FAA management seems to knows they exist.
I was employed with the GSO FSDO last year for a whole 2 1/2 months. It was terrible. DO NOT WORK FOR THE FAA. The people in the office rule the FSDO. Anything you say or do outside your “cubicle” is recorded against you. They’re all angry that they were made to return to the office to work. Their coverage of their territory is too large for the personnel they have and their Front Line Managers don’t care about anything but proper SAS entry. Morale is low and DEI is still the prevailing form of “seniority” that is used to rule the roost. Avionics inspectors (and Drone inspectors too) are not qualified to perform the duties assigned (most have NO FAA maintenance qualifications). All in all, you don’t fly, unless you’re doing a 709 ride and everything else goes to DPE’s, for which they don’t have enough inspectors to maintain a proper balance. Anyone thinking of a career and descent payout look elsewhere. You won’t get it as an ASI. They don’t follow their own SOP’s as outlined in the FSIMS and you’ll be pulling your hair out learning meaningless tasks from people who have little experience teaching you anything. Oh, and if you try to be nice and personable with people in the office, your in the wrong business. These people actually lie about things you say. I said I quit. I wasn’t fired. I QUIT! I’ve been in aviation over fifty years, never an accident or incident and worked very well with my former employer(s), but I’ve never experienced the poor morale like this until I worked for the FAA. I’m so much happier now. Many people were unhealthy there as well. I’d like to live a longer life. If you want to live a healthy and happy life, avoid the FAA.