The recent emergency landing of a Beechcraft Super King Air at Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport in Colorado using Garmin’s Autoland system was the result of a conscious decision by the flight crew, not pilot incapacitation, according to the aircraft’s operator. Buffalo River Aviation told CBS Colorado that the pilots deliberately allowed the automated system to retain control of the aircraft after a pressurization failure, describing the decision as an exercise in “conservative judgment.”
The aircraft was climbing through 23,000 feet mean sea level after departing Aspen when it experienced a rapid loss of pressurization, Buffalo River Aviation CEO Chris Townsley said. The two pilots immediately donned oxygen masks, and the aircraft’s Garmin emergency systems engaged as designed once cabin altitude exceeded safe limits. The system selected Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport, navigated to the field, and communicated automatically with air traffic control, including broadcasts that referenced pilot incapacitation. Townsley said those automated messages led to incorrect early reports that the pilots were unable to fly the aircraft.
Garmin confirmed that the Dec. 20 event marked the first real-world activation of Autoland since the technology was introduced in 2019, resulting in a successful landing with no injuries. Buffalo River Aviation said no passengers were on board at the time, and the aircraft returned to service the following day without incident. The Federal Aviation Administration confirmed it is investigating the event, noting that an onboard emergency autoland system was activated after the aircraft lost communication with air traffic control.
So at FL230 the crew donned O2 and started making decisions; great! Deciding to activate autoland in case the crew passes out; maybe a little conservative for FL230, but as part of a drill for all loss of pressurization contingencies, I can get on board with that. This is something that would be a good move in the mid-thirties, which King Air 350s can do. We don’t want to lose consciousness without deploying the system that will take us home if we pass out, right?
But this event displays the moral hazard of abandoning our roles too soon to Garmin Autoland. That system held the plane for ten minutes at FL180 crossing a mountain range with a depressurized cabin. The event took place on, basically, a right downwind from Aspen. West and northwest is the direction of descending terrain and would have allowed for nearly-immediate descent to 15000 and lower going to GJT by way of the valley through Rifle. Garmin’s autoland doesn’t seem to have the ability to discern between a loss of power or a depressurization event. Instead of pointing the plane to descending terrain with improving weather, it aimed the plane at 15000 foot mountains of the great divide. And once they were clear of the hills the plane took another 6 minutes to descend from FL180 to 10000 as it maneuvered above Boulder, CO. So it made a leisurely 1500fpm descent with a depressurization event in Denver’s terminal airspace with robot announcements of intent. All of this occurred with the crew fully conscious, capable of intervening, etc.
And maybe it’s good they DID leave it on. I think, knowing this crew was conscious, there’s a convincing argument to be made that the crew was still incapacitated. Now the cause of that incapacity may not be oxygen-related; it may be fear and negative training. Buffalo River Outfitters says the crew was ready to take over. Were they? Why didn’t they? Pressurization events are physically painful and scary. The human factors and training-management lesson hidden underneath the technology in this event is really worth exploring.
It’s easy as I sit at my computer typing here to monday-morning QB these folks. That’s not my intent. They lived and the plane isn’t broke. That’s all we can ask for. But if we take this as a success story we miss some critical lessons that we need to learn both as an industy and as individual aviators.
It took awhile for us to trust TCAS enough to immediately respond to RAs. We had to accept that commands issued by TCAS supersede ATC and the PIC. In that circumstance, we relinquish control to technology. Emergency Autoland is a new capability. It will take some time for us to trust it more than the pilot. Total incapacitation? Pressurization failure? Smoke in the cockpit? Vertigo? Unstabilized approach? Years from now, SOPs and training may specify when we need to push the big red button.
Whoa - clarity.
Crew decided to let the system continue to control the airplane to minimize risk of becoming incapacitated.
This was sudden loss of pressurization.
Note cases of slow loss of pressurization, such as a 737 near Cyprus/Greece and a business aircraft over the US.
A teacher once prolific on Avweb/AVSIG reported that serious effect of loss of pressurization can occur at much lower altitude.
Context was small GA aircraft, perhaps medical requirement for piloting larger aircraft reduce risk but airline pilots are having heart problems in flight.
Oxygen masks vary, I recall Boeing introduced a better way of stowing and donning them - a closed container, probably wearing harness straps inflate.
Boeing 747/757/767/777 Aircraft EROS Oxygen unit.- brown - GLB Flight Products.
(That’ll be the 747-400 which has two-pilot fight deck.)
Does the system respond to EGPWS warnings?
Crew needs to be mentally sharp to navigate among those rocks?
CRM, focus, keep an eye on Hal… :-o)
Crew elected to deploy the system in case they were adversely affected by the pressurization failure; this appears to be a reasonable decision. Much kudos to the Garmin system working as designed especially in one of the most challenging areas of the US -
Too many acronyms. I stopped reading.
Headline reads: “Garmin Autoland Activation Was Crew Decision“
Article reads: “ the aircraft’s Garmin emergency systems engaged as designed once cabin altitude exceeded safe limits.”
Did the crew decide to activate the autoland sequence or, did he system engage as designed?
This sounds more like they were playing with the system or childish curiosity than it does a genuine emergency. Why didn’t they respond to ATC comms?
That’s a great question! Two pilots at that.
Garmin’s autoland was designed and certified as a system of last resort to recover an aircraft when the pilot(s) could no longer do so - accepting and normalizing its use in emergency or abnormal operating conditions that should be well within the pilots capability and training does not seem like an appropriate use of the technology. It won’t take but a few emergency autoland system activations in aircraft that are not suffering a pilot incapacity before controllers start lobbying to ban the technology.
Do you ever stop to think, “This comment may not be for me? I’m on a website made for aviation related topics and I don’t know much about this. I’ll move on to other news.” ? You instead had to post a comment proudly displaying your ignorance? Could have spent the time understanding what you don’t know, moving on to something more at your level, or even just logging off and touching grass. Nobody cares you stopped reading. We just wish you didn’t comment in the first place.
Mook said it better than I can. Thanks, Mook.
You’re right. I was being snarky. I apologize.
No problem. Merry Christmas and Happy Landings.
I’m not buying any of this story. Too far fetched to believe that professional Part 135 pilots would not intervene and take control of what Garmin’s system had decided as an escape plan. As stated earlier by another contributor, Rifle Colorado was only 45 miles away and didn’t require flying over multiple 13-14,000’ mountains. Less time on oxygen, sooner descent to a “breathable altitude”.
Additionally, as a retired airline pilot, not talking directly to ATC makes absolutely no sense to me. Nor does allowing the Garmin system to carry out this “save” without stepping in at some point and regaining command of the flight. Allowing the technology to configure, land, stop and shut down the aircraft on an active runway…then climb down the airstair and walk away is ludicrous.
There’s so much more yet to be explained here in my opinion.
Two items I’d look closely at is the position of the aircraft’s pressurization bleed valve switches and whether masks were donned immediately (not 10 minutes after the event began).
Non-pilot here - Could it have been that Oxygen wasn’t actually delivered to their masks (e.g. an empty reservoir or faulty valving) and the effects of hypoxia had become sufficiently apparent that choosing Autoland was the wise and sane choice?